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CATEGORICAL MODELI,ING OF HUSSERL'S INTENTIONALITY
Imants Ba.uYs
King's College, The University of Western Ontario
This. paper is concerned

with the application of constructions from category

Smiih and Mclntyre's interpretation of Husserlls intentionality.

r

theo._rJ*tp

Not only did Eusserl's

own ideas change in the course of his lifetime2 but there are a number of interpretations of

Husserl's work3 so that the line of philosophical investigation that Husserl strongly
iniluenced is still in the process of development. In this vein, $milh_and"Mclntyre. harn
recognued"the potential for a possi.ble worlds interpre,-tation of iqte_utionality- in
w-ntiug-4 .whi,ch'has led th-em

Hu,sser_lle,

to exiend their interpretation to grve a lnauy rvorlds.

acco.unf.

of.inJ"entionaliiy.s Thus, while Smith and Mclntyre have refuted interpretations of
Husserl's rloerno in terms of ideal objects, they have been willing to explicate the noetna
using possible objects.

6

There-areo however,.limitations
pejbaQsn

to present possible worlds theories. Mos-t"notable,

is the.static nature of such worlds. By isolating a discrete act of conscio-usnesl,

one.c.ons.tructs a collection of possible worlds
fol"a$-i-ngle act is. analogous

that belong to that act. Whai one dom, -thus,

to what oqe does when interpreting an elementary classical

.theory- usi n g classi.cal..models"

The.motivation for providing a possible worlds account of intentio,nali-ty,,however,
a-r-ises

frsm the implicit presence of collections of acts which,

ini-tial.-ac,t-,in"a'numb"er of po-ssible, po-ssibly iuc.ompatible,

ls

take" i-nto ac"couut

as

it were, further

.defiae

ways. One wquld like

a11

to- -bc.able

the presence of such acts along the dimension of time which, -nat.urally,

lo-cally, orders such acts. In an effort to do this one can seek inspiration from some of--thedevelopments in intuitionistic logic which have inmrporated the notion of movement?-and,
more.s.pecific&Ily, from the Kripke-Joyal semantics which explicitly involve categorical

constructions.E The modelling given here is not, of coruse, a semantics for a formal

© 1989 Imants Barušs

Baru

ss

language, but an interpretation directly of mental events, in terms of categorical

constructions used for the Kripke-Joyal semantics.

In Sectionl the-key elemerrts-of"Smith and_Mclstyrdcigte1prciatioLqlfiu$fled]5
inLentionalitJt-arejrrielly skeLched. Srrecific categoricalcoasLructions-:.redeveJoped-in
Section.2 and thnrvn to ccrrespond,t"o the-elements -of-aLfuLentionalme,ntal enenlfur

Section.3-

SQme strrecifie

issues.r.egardiwlbeiaterBretation-of the pas.t, -beliefs and

act'ality ere raised-in sectio:ra.-"In_sec.ties-J

tbediscuc0lan_-rsgoscluded*by_eompa_rins

the

categorical interpretetion,-deyeloped"in_seetions:i-^aud-4*:rit}-[he_man$Jorld$
int erpretalios .of Smith_asd*ldelet$s.

L_IUSS ERI,, S LN rpN IT oNA!ITX.
Husserlwas_isteresledj-a_erplalsiugjhe_qa,ture'Oltlqs_e_!0ellalgsqlilghighsrg
ChAraqlqrrzed ly*rutenti"qn-alrtJ,_ _He ealled ia.cts of cAn$ciousn_e-$pl-

!h_o,.se_e-v_qnt_s-:gtri-ch

r_elated.-lA,
an object."1 I.:s_tead pf*explicgll"Bgig_t*eqtiqnatily,by ex_qlqining t!e--na!gj-e_q{-t_hJ_p!.!gglq
tgtulri*s--wh-qh--aS!.q*o,f- cogscip-upsgs$ are, dir-gg!.e-d,

Eugterj'j_aeqoust

grq_ b_e viewgd

a$_

gmith-and Mql+.tyrg h-av-e-gtalpqgd_tlel

o_ng w_biqb Feeks !9_ Ug,{_erstaq{

in_teqt!_o_qally.isler4gs of

thgrelations$p_b.,elseegtbesu-bje-c__t,and_thcebieqt-.r0
Eagh*qp!$crqu"s.-agl, acce-rding

A-Aprgil,3*naens_atd

to Smith and Mclntyrg,

aq__o_b&st,___Ahe aoes?q

is the

r_eal

con-sisls of-three

pad, gf a cp,nS=cio-u-s_ aqt.wtrieb makes.

the experienge intedioual"t_l-,T*c-ao,,er?.o_, g-s the other_hasd,_i,s
kiu{qtneaula&_or_$raa-13.
reqe-usJ,.

jf

Ib_e_-oal"ologr_s-d*-si-a,t-us_of th-e

!hus* jm-act*miarl&Jisdir_eete.d

to'ward- or

conp-erpntl-

i_s

n_e-t

lre_all -but aq a_t_empor-al

_oljest is_rr$lquada_utL oq-this
iale_n"tiqaal_ty

relaledlq).as*shi?et

aqd*edy-if-the-aet (or its.noesis).entertaius a eer,tain--noe-natie*Siau-and,that Siqn

pres_qnbes.-t

hat

ob iecL. "

13

Objects of natural experience are transcendent objects in the sense that they can
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never be fully conceptually captured in a single

act. This is due to the fact that the

perceptual evidence for the existence of such objects is always incomplete from the point
of
view of a single act.14 In fact, perceptual experiences are more complicated than other

intentional experiences such as, for example, judging, remembering and imagining, because
they entaii a sensory aspect. The barrage of sensations
and requirs

a

Sinn to give

or hyleis an aspect of the noesis

it shape so that it can be experienced as a perception of

something.ls For Husserl, perception forms the basis of one's understanding of the world
and hence received much of his attention.16

This problem of the perception of transcendent objects highlights the fact that
uelac:i
g-f sgnsci.ousness

exists in isolation frsm other acts. Something about the Object

lef! opea in an act with a particular Sinn. In order to explicate the way it
de-t-e.-rm=ruatious.

always

whic-h_ f,urth-er

of an object are possible, Husserl introduced the totion of .an ac-t::-ho--ri-zo_n-

0.,eple-c-tion of possible acts whose Sinne are compatible
t-b"-a"t..ea-n

_is

with the Sinnof thg o_ngin'al_.aeL

-

further determine a given object. rT parallel to this act-hori-zo-u i-s*aa

-ob"ject-- horizQn

which is the collection of further determined objects that

Qf cOnsciOusness are directed- tO.warde

th-es_e_fu_rth,e_r-,a.ets.

.18

asgo-rdiug tq smith and Mclntyre's interpretatioq- o{ Eu-$_erl"s_t}s-o.I_Lff*eaeh
b-€,b-r-oken

EipL@

dowa into two components: the'predicate senses,which prescribe_ t!p*properties

that aq object is to have, and an x which specifies the object to which
the,pr_orer-t&s*arc
ascribed*11--.F-ru-t-her d9ter-mination

to be mei-by*a-u_o-bje-c_t,, glven_in

of an object, then, consists of further conditions-tba! are

-ae--t's

w-dh thesame,X

following an examination of Husserl's notions of horizon and manifold, h,ewe:et,
S-mit-h and

Mclntyre relaxed the constraints on the definition of an act-horizon,

sinne of the acts in the horizon need not be strictly compatibie with the srrzz
q-r-igrgal- a-el20

al-owing for further perceptions of ar object that reveal

it

to.-

o__f

so

that the

_the

be -dif&-re-g.i

trom wha.tit was originally perceived to be, and so that these further aets Leed.np-t

Baru
g-g,cggsqdly.fqrther determine the object
l!-.?.1.It is

in the sense of ipcludipg fugh,-e1lnform.atio-4

this more liberal interpretation of horizon that is adopted

For Busserl, each &ct-horizo,u is predeli-neated iu aq a-qt- qf
pps-sible a-ejs are understood
aJs$ee-----------------n

,as sot-

V
ss

ab_oul

he-re-.

c-onseiou$n-ess so

to further determine {he object of the original act,

doiqg so. These fult-her possible acts canlot be mqrely iogleatly

-t_ha-t_!s-!o_e.

an-d

_o-t-be_rs

p_"qssi.b]e,

b-ut.must be motivated by what the subject believes to be p,o-ssible.22 T$s bri_ags to Ugh-t

tlte ipportance of -relevant background beliefs and items of knowledge t-h4t d-eteruue
w"H-eh Sinne

T-be

arc to be.included in on aat::-hod?e8*23

aet-horizon has a temporal structure. In the case of percsption, fo1 ex4pB_!g,

ean -h.ave a series of possible
gBe .w9-Le.
-t"o- -see a

future perceptions that further determines ag obi)c!,,_ Thus,i-f

ttee o,n a hillside, walking closer to the tlee

t:e-e-,"n-th--red lea-ves,

-ogg

_qra51

reveal

it to be a malle-

and so on, -These further possible perception$ wguld be=acts in-.the

bp"uzoa--oJ-t-h-e-original act

in which the tree is first noticed. Now, if the tr-ee \{'-ere a map_l.q

treeiu.t-h re-d leaves on a hillside, then there would be a nun,b-el oJ possib,le.co-mb_inat.ia,ngp-f
furt-her" per-ceptions,

that would reveal this. Smith

aud.-Me-Iu-tyre eall c-o--q-tinuous

Bos"sihle,f,urther perceptions, 'possible verification chains', and
{ur-t}e.:"p'"erccp*-t.ious, whic-h
qlr-ams'-24

s-eri-e-s*of

collectiqgg.o_f_,s-e-n_e-s_ei[

reveal the. same ohrjeet, they call a family of pqosib_le veri-fi_qatio:

Thus, the act-horizon can be articulated by talkirrg

a-b,out

tbe

-c-p.Jleqti-o*n-o.f-a[l

f-amilies of possible verificaJion" e_halss.

The igtroduction of families of verification chains allows for the developmeqt
pos-qible worlds
p,Oltespouds

o-f_g

interpretation of Husserl's intentionality. 'Each family of verification chains

to a possible object, but since these acts which constitute the hOrizon a_r*e-..ta_bA

qo-direated with the original act, that original act can be understood to be direcled- ia*a11y
of

-a

num-ber o-f possible o-b,jects

iq possible wsrlds.

Co-{irectedness requires that the Sinne of any two acts in the horizon have
the same determinable

X-

the same X as the Sinn of the original act

-

and

Baru
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that their respective rrcontentsrr (conj<lint predicatmenses) be mutualiy
rrharmonioustt, compatible according to the subject's conceptual scheme.25
Lt."is -thi*s

abtlity

ia.t.ended

in the act, by examining that act's horizon, that allows for

a-q-eouu-t

t,o

of i nt enti

identify a lumber of different ways of completing tbe same
a possible

o-b_jeetr

tsg-Lid.s

na-lr,,tJ.

o

Eowever, Smith a.ud Mclntyre, in their extension of Husserl's work, forsake the very

temporal structure that allows for the presence of possible objgcts by conceiving of t.hemas
po"s.sible.objects

in possible worlds reached by a choice function for any given act,

effo-r,t here, on the

other hand, is to retain the ternporal structure of the horizon and to

shorv how specific categorical constructions, those used
t"op-oi,.

..Jlhe

in the definition of Grothegdieek

cas provide a more dynamic many worlds interpretation of intentio"udr.gr.

2. GROTHENDIECK

TOPOI.

:
1

Some simple constructions from category theory are introduced

in this section, with the

assumption that the reader is familiar with the basic notions of set theory. Categories,
pretopologies, sites, functors and sheaves, the ingredients of Grothendieck topoi, are
defined below.26 These will be used to model Husserl's intentionality in the remainder of

the paper.

To begin with, a category is a collection of nadeswith anows between them, known
as

a directed, graph, to which further conditions apply. The nodes are usually called objects

and the arrows sometimes dso called rnorphisms.

If Cis d, category, then C Ob27 is the

collectionofobjectsof Cand CAr2Eisthecollectionof arrowsof C. Theobjectatthetail
of an arrow is known as the domain and that at the head of an arrow as the codomain. If.

Cis a category and
usuaily denoted

/

is an arrow of C, with domain o and codomain

D,

then this arrow is

u oJO.

In order for a directed graph to be a category, it must obey the laws of closure,

Baru
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identity and associativity:

(i)

Closure: lf. o Jioand

C which consists of

/

and is designated by

(ii) Identity:

b

Ac

followed by

arearrows of a category C, then there exists an arrow in

g. Thib arrow is known

as

the composition of f and

g

a&s.

For each object oof a category Q there is an identity arrow, Io, with the

if oJiois an arrow of Q then 1J= f : f lt
(iii) .4ssoc iatitity, n o Jt &t Lais a configuration of objects and arrows of C, then

property that,

f (sh): (fs)h.
Thus, a category is a collection of objects and arrows with some straightforward

properties. The collection of all sets with functions between them is the most obvious
sxampl€ of a category.

Dilferent pathways in a category can be indicated using diograms. If all the
pathways between any two objects in a diagram are the same arrow, then the diagram is
said to commute. For example, the following configuration of objects and arrows from a

category C

o

f'

9",

iq,-d
is a d.iagram. If

1t

fg

: it

lr

then the diagram commutes.

Furthermore, the above diagram is a pallbock sguore if

that for every x e COD and arrows rLiaand
arrow

x

s /,c with 0S -

o ,athat
makes the following diagram commute.

''1t
;... o, \
\0\; lr' Pb
lr
e

tI

it has the universal property

u-g

,+d

rlf,there exists a unique

\/

Baru
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it as a pullback

inside a square identifies

ss

square.

"With the aid of the notion of a pullback square, the concept of

lo-coli-tg

eaLhe

inJroduced in a ca-tegory. This is done by associating with each objestju a category a

numberof-c,ollections olarrows that terminate at that object. Such collecti.o-us*olasow.r,
satisfyiug tb-e clo-sure conditions below, are ealled- c oae.ts. If

-au

object -tha!-rs the d.ouain-oJ

au-affow,is thought of as a 'firture' state with,tespect to the codomain of.au arrow,Jtren
different.-covers can beinterpreted asdiffrrent po.rsible

futures.

li

More formally, a pretopology is an assignment2e

coa: c ob

(c

-,

Ar)PP

which takes a e C Ob to a collection of sets of arrows of Cwith codomain o, satistying the

following conditions:

(i) 0FaCoa
That is to say, the empty set cannot be a cover of

o.30

1

(ii) {a -3-ay e a Col
That is to say, the singleton consisting of the identity will always be a cover of an object.
f_
(iii) LetXbeanindexset,and Yrbeindexsetsfor reX. tf {ac -',atxe8e
and for each z e X,

- ft^

{o;Oo:

y

f

{afrJ!-a;.

g e Yr} e

aCou

orCoa then

€ Yrand ge,4 e a Cou.

In other words, covers can extend indefinitely into the future, since the elements of the
covers of the codomains of arrows

in a cover of a can themselves be composed with the

elements of a cover of o to give a new cover.

f

(iv) If {o;La,xe 4
r e X the pullback

b,

e aCoa,whereXisanindexset,and b-9-aE C Ar,thenforeach

f:

or4b
o

of.

frilong

g

Barus

fi' arr
a 9l

s

,o

Pb lr^
It:
l'
ln

existsand{D'oo,!o:leX}ebCou.ffi"rds,foranassignmenttobea
pretopology, any specific cover must be sufficiently mobile to become a cover of any
possible future state.

;fcateggry

fu-tu-geq

C, together with a pretopology.Cgtr, ?$*A*-p:dgred_paif <_C,Cpa>,

ca4 be asqocia-ted with-each

olbgl. The next step is to identify the categorical

structures which can be used for the interpretation of events that take place within this

temporal grid. To do this, the notion of a functor is needed.
A functor is a structure*preserving function between categories. As such,

it

takes

objects to objects, arrows to arrows, and preserves composition and identity. That is to
say, for categories Cand D, a functor

at--+aF for objects and (a

Fis defined

JA!,-,1op F

as a function

Jt

C--D

with action

,iDf) for arrows so that

(i) (/g)r - fFgF whenever /9 is defined3l
(ii) loF : lorfotall o€ C Ob.
A

contraaariantfanctor is a functor that turns around the directions of arrows so that

domains become codomains, and codomains become domains. That is to say, in the case of
a contravariant functor, the action for arrows becomes

pJtT r-*(Dr F,otr)
and (i) above becomes

UdF:

gFfF whenever /9 is definedin C Ar.32

fhe.-flnclors of in-t€re$L here are contravariant functors that map arbitrary categories into
lhe category S whose objects are sets and whose arrqws are,funqtions. The

_f*unqtor-itse_1fis.

Baru I
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astack. For a e C Ob, oFis called astalko\ fibreover_@,asd saeg{js,talled_a

genn-

Thir

coastruslr_on cau be visualize_d-as

arrows-of-a,,eat-eg,ory

wheat

fidd.

-a.4,1_aq4r

grl*d,uade up of-Jhe-.obiscts and

witb stalks, filled with germs, sitting over the o-bjeSts like whe*ali:r_a

-W*hat }ap,pens,in*tbp coursg of modelling,

represe&ts,temp-o-ral movement-, the stalks

-th-e

is that the catega-Li-ed{nd

directedaess at a given_!lo-!oen-t, and the

&eru0s-t.be-p4rticulars"ofevente. All that remains now is to employ the notion of locality

as

given by the pretopologies.

Let

(

C,Cou> be a site and

f^

X} e a Cou then the pullback of. fralong f,
f''
qlnno f is
is called o
o -l4oV and the pullback
rrclr of
nf f along
i< called ax, on Lorfor each c
-x ^' a *g
/"
a
{
{a"--a

a:

r

E

and y in the index set X, as shown in the diagram.

or,o

oyLoa

Pb 1,,
l,;
r f^ I
a;-+a

If F is a stack over c then the image of ar,
the image of.

f,

orJLais

f-'
o#oris
o

F&

called

F.

called aF

o{ --j-(ox, a, ar)F and,

-J-arF, for aJI r, y e X.

T,he,geru6-irlhe stalk-s are. sot .unrelated to sne another, but follow-iu rcve$e
-dreqtiou, the pathways taken by the a$gws Thus, for so e oF,

if b -9-a eQAr,then

so

gets carriedto sogF € ,Fs3. Now, theJrretopo-lqgJ:oq-a-*c_a_Le&orJ-eaa be
us_edlo d€fiae.

ctraraeleristics of tbe relatioaships between the germs. Iu p-agtlc.-ulaq if€ells-s_ia*stal"}q pver
a-qqllel coinciding in future states given by pullbacks origlnated frola

_t-he

_q,aase€,ejejnlhe

pre$entn then tbis gives a way of characterizing stalks
for wbieh,futurq-co*aditions grve

idaruatioa about

a current state o-f affalfS.

More formally, aslac&-tr is a sheaf over the site

<

C,Coa> if

it

satisfi,sgj_he

Baru
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ng atib ilitA

c.o n

ss

diti o ru

{t3", x e E e a CoaJst*,e C Obasd aqy. couecti
geru$ {sre orF: s € 4 that,are Aairwise. comBagible, i.e., sfi: tV4for all
Cicen-anJr-rnyer

E,

!

E

X, there js-exactly one so e cf'sgibatl

That is to say, whenever:he€erm$ ol

stal-ks

oflr= lrfor all x € X.

lq a--eoygr-Lbat*are-plirwr$,e.pulledback-and

Sqw-u t-o be t-he same originated from a single germ, then the

s!-a-c-k-

is^ka-o:sp,as-a.sIeal.

Ihe-collections of sheaves over a site generate a category C Sh called a Grcilteadic&
tppes.

3. A CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND TOPOI.
I-be correspondence between acts of consciousness and the elementq-qfGptbegdiegklgBgt
hinges on the use of a category to reflect the organization of possible acts ig
_!i!qeJ!hg

jdes*ti*figgli9a-of ger.lu-Jith the possible obpcts of mental events charaptqriz-ed
bJ
:gies-tr..9pali.tfagd-of a cove-r of a categorical object with a family of verification chai_q*sJ!
fu the purpose of this sectien to explicale,tleSe ideas.

As"tarting poist-for lhe development of this modelling, is the noticing that lived;cts
deopscjouoness can be thought of as discrete events, strung together, somehow, _i.Iltiqe*as
pa$-sf-!-be-9xp€desce gf.a person.3la-gi":ngle -a"et-,,vnth

-Tbgg;g*o,bjept e in a c*g-tggory Qcaq be thought

ofal

the*ar-ro[s- hetw$n objects-as the transitions from one possiblege!_!g.

asstler.- For the purposes of this modelling,
for which th.ere is an arrow

b

&a

E

LY--thiukisg-offutute events as those

a future event for event a woul,d_be*aqeyed-0

C Ar. The d.irection for the arrow caa b-e ia-t*erpreted

co-ilg towaldS;-pgrgen. If one allows only future

acts that cannot be genuine replications of past acts, one could choose only categories in

which there are no auows

a

h,b€ C Arfor every future
b.35 If one makes thefurther

restriction that a person can get from one act to a next in only one way, then the category
representing possible acts in time becomes a partially ordered set. Leaving open the widest
10

V
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scope for interpretation,
Bas$-l-bl9--aets

in thiq diJc_u0.$i,Qp_, gatggories, ag gugh,.

of consciousness. To each person one assigns a category that

Da6$ible-p.ast, present and future

tsls

t h-e

c_Aug$peLd_-tp_the-

s

dmaus_Af

rep_rese.atg__theil

acts. Within such a category, a pgtlgn_\pqul_d*tm,ce-a,palh

paa! -i!-t o-thelulure..

Eaeb tltentional, mental event, for Husserl is characterized by a

.9_,iAf o_r

ueCagtgg

tha*t.difeqts the act lgwards an objgct. As Smith and Mclntyre have suggested, thg--bgd_gg
qA$Le_d

b: the Sinne c4g be moved

to the objqcts that an act,is direc!*e*d_lp:v-"U.d$,J[bgl9

tlose-p-*b.iec-ts are'p-p's_sible o_=bjec"ts.36

In the spirit of their enterprise, the

dls*eSlg-d"Sg.l_hal,the directedn,ess itgelf is podelled by the sheaves
qkulkg.qv-er -th,e o-bjects

g----------------_lzais

hglte

wl'ich detqrgr4e- tfo

itr a q4tegory, thg predicate contents and X replaced by the

qLbsls-Lv-Hqb- are r,nodelled by the germ!

in

po$_sjble

th-e--9!alks, and any residual e*pegqaee"-af

l0eali-qg that 43y characteizn noentata, moved into the catego:ical Object itself, w*hiqhjS,
basiedly-,. the- poes'ds, the lived part of the act.37 Thus, the directedness of
soasrd*ered.to be the actiou of a single sheaf F

a,a.

a-st-is

in c sh on a4- o--bjepl-_aof_e.

&jSj"ppgrt_a$-t.te go_tiqg thal possible obigts persfqt iq !Ugq. For example,

at ais directed towards the germ soe aF, then, for anyfuturestate 6with,
the object so of the mental act o becomes the possible object

function

aF

9F ,bF €

-a-Ppear o-t-a gtven

S Ar.

s

ogF

are-

an act

&ae

C Ar,

g"_A*i?clglhal

qa$red, po-psibly in changed form, !s!g._the-luture.

T.hei.nte-rc$ti.ng feature of Eusse-r-llp.illeutro-sality however,

that sheaves_grler-gjiLe

dlpw ole to model, !s -qgt -tle simple s!ryctu:q of intentional mental
effec.ts

if

e DF by the action of the

Bpsagge--qt-!h-,e- gg-,4!.ravariance of_-t_he funcj_p*

poiut in tipe,

lelg

-ey-e-qts-and

tbeir

oq,tLe*fdure.-butlhe iqflue-s-qe-afubq futug*gn the p-resent. In order to model

ttr.!s,

the familiee oj.possitrtsve:ification chains, the collections of temporal sequeeceg,that
de-teusi4epossrb-le,.objeeiuare to correspond to the covers of aq object

ain a qategorLe.

T.hs*dlows f,or one way of makiug p:eerse i-he notions of -syulhsissfiden_lificallse,

uhereby the Sinne of the acts iq au act-hp-rizon form one lcomposi-te .9iznl aud th*e-i-Aenti-ty
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Inlhc

the ac-ts itr "ar ac!=!*aeae.

-first- case,

by conceptualizipg

a$- a-cl ho-ri,zqg-a6--a

cqllec-tio!-af--ve-n-fi.eaiiss

*ai,as-, theuselves consisting of possible, though experiencable nqls,
iysth*esis of identification of the Sinne.with
ILLbe.s,e-cond case, the possible

obict

!!9 actual

o4_e_,rep*l_4-c^e^s_lb€.

Sinne of the acts f91-41gg-a-Eayer.

determinsd by the Sinns.ot ayeriflcaJlos--clai!

wsdilbe. mQre or less characterized in mutually compatible,rqals-

by_JLe*aqgs of a

verificati-os chain. Therefgre, rather than retaining the notion of the objgct
the,-uerifieaiiou chain, one can allow
partr cular

-ae-t-

&*may

s

it

aE .$la-t_r_e*alang

to be the object that would be "det-e*rpi-_np_*djLa

in-au*igtiarias.

be-.u,sefrd to-_l_oq*k-.al a4

exa4ple. _,One maX

Se-e

yhat loqts_l&e a tree in an

ori$sal--ael sfper-cepti-on. ]Ihe act-horizon consists of a num_ber of ysugqatrge_chai!$
:uheJe-ihis t-ree is g:plored in particular ways, revealing
red-l.gaygq,-o-n"a-billside, and so

it to be pe.r.-!=apq_A-!qapl_e Ege-wil}

on. Al alternate collection of verilcatioglbal$_lgqy

relleal-tl-e-jrce-to*bglhe holograpt'!,-c- image of a maple tree with red learles, 9n -a bllside
and.so on. "At the point- of the initid*ast, one has not yet determined that the
tree-.rather t-han _tbelqlographic image_of such a tree. There AIe

obi:cts, theq, that

_are

prqsent in tbe r_,qiliat act-fqflhis

delgdued rrrlbqu-t.judgement

as to

_At

trw is a rcal

least three eg_s_sjlle

egtqple-lb9!99j€"itlg

its reality or non-reality, the tree interpteted

j€j

uapl,e !"rec. atrd-thelree--i-aierprete-d--as a holographic image of a nqaple tree. In

otler uqds.

eSeh.ob&etsas--be*u,ad*erstaad- as-"a possible obJect, determined as

objgel*gdy

ug-tO-a-CeltArn,-p-oin-t.

That is to s4y, the changes of the object

tr:Ide-r-s*to9--d.A6-_cp.4tIlejis€,

tha!

poosr-b-le

on,a,..co_ver -qag_be

or veritying the possible obtct given in the.iur--t_ial sgt

Igs-ugLaforu.ulalios",t-be-role that the object-horizon caq.-haye iq dele-ruoJs-uglh€
objeet i-a the-ini-tial actn is.rev-ealed by Lhe compatibility condition.

future mentd-cv-eatc iuwhich

"t-he

If there is a sequ-eaee-gI

objects that are determined are pairwise rerg3le-d ta, be

the-same-oblbct isarurcpdat-e fu-rther-fu-turq-states, then they can be said to deterqi4e

T2
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act. This is just a sta|eg-e-4_!

relstble,sfie_cljn---the._o_ri_Srnal

s

pf-!h-e cqmp"alibili_tyepldili-Ag

when the future mental states are the categorical objects of a cover f-ol a4_Ab_jggt_d_AI_Ag!
glegn$*cJausstrl.

Finally, j-t cal be

s_hown

that the collgclions

q_f

falsrliefl.p.fpossible verificatio,n

salis-fy t-he-defi.ning conditions for a pretopology defi-ned in

tle last se-ction.-,e,oa-dtion (i) is

met-tri-dally, in that an act-horizon must consist of 4t lgast ong
qlq;-q _i4!_erqs_ting.
a-st-*horizp-n

It

agt.*.-Q_q-n{i_tien

(iilis

translates into the statement that an initial aC! mUq-t*be_ag

in and of itseif. This corresponds to the

suspe-nds judgement as
the-o-bje--cJ.

ch_ains

case

in the example a_bove rvhe*re.-a-q9

to whether or not the tree is a real tree or a hologrg,phic

i-m_a€e_aurl

of the act is only that which is determined in the aet_itself.

eo-n-di-ti-on

(iii) gakes precise the notion that no obict is ever fully

dgte-r^u*in-eAJul

Sub"iee-t.-to

further determinations. Any act in the horizon is itself an "qngr^u-AJ*agt._Wlhjl6

collectipn

qf-

act hsrizons.

hmaou"_rshieh_"iu

These help to determine the object of such an act--in*t-he-acl

turn is part of the horizon of the

origtu-al_a_ct-.

Qgnd$ioqliv)"s-!a!e-S that the possible determinations of objects at a given po-iulj!
tiBe-are*uaJl-os!,-b.ut modified under changes of circumstance. In the exampl_e_alqvg,

EuppA$g-0*o is the action o{ turning around and speaking to someone and then-f-a.elglhe
bee-.-agai-n.. The options

Slppqse tbat-o-n-e h-ad

that one had initially are still there, but in

$po--ken t-g

modi-fi-pd

fors.

thg ar,tist responsible for the-holograpf,ic maple tree.

cardesaddrtion-d in{-otmaliou- into act

6 when one again

O-ne

confronts the tree. Orre i.$__s*tdUeftr

tul!*h,!he-aet-horizonq that one started-,with, but the furt[er acts would.be_._q"qd-6sd
bec-ause

of {he changes in expectation, perhaps, of what this object that is tA*be

gnsoun-t-ere-d

is like. In act

6,

just

as

in act o however, the

qbjee,t l-_eed-_upLk"furlhcl

dei-ermined, as demonstrated, for example, by consid-ering that th-e per$on._c_1-al!m_4&lojg
tLe--arl-is"t had

lied about the tree being a

ho-lo€raphic_ -i.m-agg.

Suplose, however, that the act a-3-b were to take one into a vgry d.ifferent-Situa-tia!.
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$glpg_qe, fqr e..''ca!qple,_thet t-he, ttqgLry-erg tq- bp vaporizgd

qbserver, s.omehqlg-lqlla3uJeu-61y, lpued, so

t[a!

nolbe possible. In such Lcase. the pullback of
a

V
ss

iq Q q_Uqlqal "bql_qcgUql_agd$g

the--o5_r,giagil_

fqrt_ler {etefprn_aliqg1]gdd

g, given as (@ *a

b)Aa,

would give rise to

function orr 46r'ob)Fthat would correctly rellect what had happened to

s,eo,F,38na-ely,thatithadbeenvapourized.Inotherwords,atD@
possibiUty_of ,vegfyi,u&

the_Lr-e_s*eqge_

ef

a--v,Ap9U31z9{

lreg or yApo,W1agd_hp_l_qg,rAphisjlqa€e_Af

q'!ree" One would never be able to decide, perhaps, which

it

would have been in the first

place.

9ne of the benefits of this

uqode-lligg"_ig -t-hat ca!_egotrcal_OtrU,c-tu-res allow_for

ag

lqterpretaliosjlt-:rb*c-h ob$t-s- are-allowed-!o ch4nge faithfully with changes tg-lg_age

a,e,

tq.:Lbe next.

4. THE PAST, BELIEFS AND ACTUALITY.
Eor Husserl-an.actls,temporal horizosexte,*ads not-only into the future, but into thela,st
as--lrell- There are,- 1s1 ore-ple, possible past perceptions that one- could

rcss-ihle, "not experieuced"act c,

tlat

trarejarLhufiirl

can nonetheless inlluence the expedqeceii--c.

Sin0ilarhr, the past portions of Lhe verifica-tion chains of Smith and Mcb-ty-rellcanleseen
as arro rrys-leaving-t he4 ref,ent

-

Eo-wever, what cau or cannot be recovered from the past is not a matter-ofuhepasL

but"ofjhe-pr.esenlaud thp-fu-tue-that is to say, the past is o-nly applicalle to an acl
igmfar.as"il'"cosdiiio-n6 uhatlapneno in t-be-p_rerest or can be _recoy_eredin a fu:tier_act_In
the present modelliug,,then, all of tbe,-possible pasts converge iq

tle

presenJ-rv.lucb_alone-is

4ecessarylor understanding the future possibilities. This reflects the 4otion tbat th_e+asj
has

beet..urat.ted ,y takiug a specifie path. The possibilities that could have existed and.

those that can existin*the future are afuqction of the beliefs that are possible {t_ary_grve.n
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aci*Ihese--beliefs themselvm,, are determi,qe-d*by the actual path that has been tra-nersqd.

lLkeepin&.with"the notion that beliefs predelineate theIossible future determinatioas_.of.an
gb.ies-t"*-o*s"e-'has"to

po,sii Lhat

specifies only those futures

"t*hg

pretopology Cou on a category Cis such that every cover

that are held

t-o be

possible. For example, if one is co-nfronted

sith-ruh.at appears to be a maple tree with red leaves and has no und-erstaudr-ag*of whatn
holographic image is, there is no cover for those future events.wbi-ch jnlact reve-al-the
m,aple tree

rviih red leaves to be a holographic image. It is importaqt to,ao-te-,bsreolha.Li[,

ia^facf"*'one.is.exposed to a holographic image, rather than a real tree, t,he-re-ar-e-frture
gvents^-to-.s.ubstantiate

that.

These do not, however, constitu-te ve_nfieatip_u_dal"ns,sirce

there.is uo possible object in the original act which is to be verified. In the absense-.ofa
cover"-ihe compatibility condition does not apply, and despite the presence of comp-atible
fui-ure-obiects-,no-po-ssi-ble-ob&-et- o-f

tbejree as a holographic image,ls

pre,qegl- i_ujhe

o-riginal act.

But this brings up the problem of actuality. Not all possible past or future paths can
be

traversed. Suppose one does, in the above s;lample, attempt to traverse the future path

that corresponds to the tree being a real tree, only to find out that

it is a holographic

image. In such a case, the continuous perception of the tree as a real tree explodes forcing
the object one has chosen to be'cancelled'.al The hyte stemming from the actual world are

not those of the original choice of object, but of an object which was not before present,
though, or course, an unjudged portion

original act.

It

ofit

could have been chosen as the object of the

is interesting, however, to note that there is an interplay between the

actual and the possible according to Husserl, because of the role that Sinne play in giving
shape

to

sense impressions.

5. COMPARISON OF TEE CATEGORICAL AND POSSIBLE WORLDS
hor"d"er--Lo de-yelop their!_ossibfe_w-o-.rlds,ihes;yJ_zutb aud
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qf-pa-ssibk-v-erifi*eatisu-ebar,mJplle-cli-o-qs- qf-.wUsh, c*0-u$J-itul9 as-aellc

s

]odzar*lhe.r

abstracted the.possible objects.defited,by families of s-uch chains frop the temppr.dfftiltrg
jg-w-hieb they origi-uale.Jaking their cue from Carnap,s meaning funguggs,

_t_hey

weut on

Lodefine the Sjzz as that function which selects, for any given possible wo--rld, an-objecli!
$hat world to be the object of an act. Smith and Mclntyre made the d.istinction bg-tween a
Husserlian possible worlds theory in which the notion of. Sinnis retained, that is tp_salr, a

theory i-u:u-bicb llag-aetbintentionality*consists in a pattern of directgdnesg that reacbes

inlo-:ario-ur difierenlpossible worlds^u:rder the noematic guidance of the act's
a purelossible.worlds theory

in

which-.

Sinqr11.'_aud

the ,Sinz is -deleted and which "asoum.:es that

intention consigts in a complex relation, a pattern of directedness, that obtains betwegej
pglogi-43-gives"gq$s-ibJp world and certain possible objects, i.e., objects in various possi-ble
worlds'r.4

s

Sesides the fact.-that these possible rcorlds have been isolated from t,he sequenc.e-of
gostribte-acts--that gave rise to them, the pure possible worlds acc-ount appears io--c!.augelhe

aggnalsiruet:rre of an act of

consciousness

in

a fundamental

way. As stated in t-beffcotd

qUotaiion iu..Lhe paragraph aboven this accouqt assigns te a person in a grven po-ssible wprjd
.a

possible o-bject, thereby losing the self of intentional mental events. There is a differenr.e

between saytug that Jhe domun of a meani4g function is a thinker over time or a collestian
of possible*worlds. In the former case, the functioa replacg the dire'eJednes!_of

inteutionality- In the second case, the meadng funet-isurelates

pos,sible rryor,Lds_aEd ob.iects

in those rvorlds without any reference to a self that persists betrveen

possib-Le worlds.

One-can, in faci-, recover Smith and Mclntyre's p-ure possible woddrJtreory-of

inleniionatit'rfton-tnecategorical account without losing the temp-oral. coltext or the-relf.
Tq do this,-"oaelets"*the category C be a partially ordered setaa and one defiu-es a-parLia]
section to be a

farlial function from the elements of the partially ordered set C Ob to the

collection of stalks over C defined by a sheaf F, so that functoriality is pre-.oerved,,-Abalis.
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to say, one defines a partial function s: C Ofu-rS 06 with action

o*rowhich

is such that,

if b -9-a e C Ar and sO is defined, the s, : sagl.
*Eussed lpeaks-qf*both"-as internal horizon and- an exter4al=fug11zoJ*
tAejormer

collesposdiag to the

furthq determinations of the characteristie-s*q1a.a

_object, and the

lallerlo--tbe relatioushiP$ that an object has to all other obtcts in its enviroqn*enillllir
vi-alhe external horizon th-a{.,,in principle, an entire possible world is.-r*e_v.ealed,ju*_whieh-a

Posu-ble'obict is situated. But t-hes, !qgr,e-ge-"q,e:ally,
Qf a &erm so at-anevcal.ae.e-Ltir-q.

-tbqc-o:mp-l,ele

p-o!$!le-:r*o:ldJhs partiat

future--deteruuratioas

uot-tqul-Tls,-the

rrossihre

tcodds-of-Smith and Me_lutyresepartial.s_e*c,t_ions that are rglev,an.t_lg.d!
aetO*r-evediag

hox

t'hes*e-poffiihLe -rvor-lds can dev*elop, and are

not just rel-evant to_a cisgle act-

It irrhe

-aaiegary-af Po,ssib-l-e.acto.Jts-e-LLlblLt glues together the determinations that form pqssible
a

tsodd--Thus-*thapaitern oldiree-tedness of the pure possible worlds account is
capturedin
the categrrncal. aecount by the collection of partial
sections over the partially ord-ered.sel_of
all*act s of esane-i o*usaesS.

Anqther woJ--of u-nderstau-dnS

po-0-srble

lyor,ld! in. t.he catsgorical qgsLext,

sulerimnosed o.n the first, is to consider
different sheaveg as radiedly di-ff_erent meaniags
that corild b-e ausigned to the sarue, aets. ThEius,tead-pf.sps!:dens&agrglasheaf

4.q+e

cOuld*ca$idet.otler sheaves in C

Shw-hie_h_ruqrd_d-grye

qfJor6ible-ouiects,---MovemerLb-etween

perhaps en_tirely diffe,re_q-t eollecti.ous

sbeavglwourd be via natural transforma,t_ig-ns,.t}e

of C Sh.that wouldsostinue to preserve the temporal dyaamic. with the poteutial
fo' the readmission of a uumber of sheaves in the modelling,
pnssi6-ility-of-exploitias
amows

-the

the--top"qil.lruclure of C

5[

should be explored. The utilization of the subobject classifier

Jor the assignemnt of truth-values to some of the arrows of

C

Shmay be.a, uleld.s_tratr€y.

In summarJL"tben* tbe modelling presented here,
u,sing c4tego,rieal-eonrs-trustll$t,
rgledsJhe dynamies of Husserl's intentionality in a more explicit
uranq-er tban doeslhe
Bglsrblerodds-acco

un

t ol-Smi th and Mclu-tgre
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